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ABSTRACT
Watermarking is an operation of embedding an information into an image in a way that allows to
identify ownership of the image despite applying some distortions on it. In this paper, we presented a
novel end-to-end solution for embedding and recovering the watermark in the digital image using
convolutional neural networks. The method is based on spreading the message over the spatial domain
of the image, hence reducing the local bits per pixel capacity. To obtain the model we used adversarial
training and applied noiser layers between the encoder and the decoder. Moreover, we broadened the
spectrum of typically considered attacks on the watermark and by grouping the attacks according to
their scope, we achieved high general robustness, most notably against JPEG compression, Gaussian
blurring, subsampling or resizing. To help us in the models training we also proposed a precise
differentiable approximation of JPEG.
Keywords Blind watermarking, JPEG, Attacks, Adversarial training, Neural networks
1 Introduction
In the recent years the multimedia market has been steadily growing. The services provide access to vast range of
desired multimedia and are getting more convenient to use, e.g. Netflix offers offline access to movies and TV shows [1].
It causes an increase in illegal redistribution of copyrighted content. One of the most efficient method to prevent such
behaviour utilizes embedding of human-invisible watermark in the digital content.
Watermarking uses the fact that the current bandwidth of digital image signals is much higher that the amount of
information which could be properly received and interpreted by human. It is well-known that a human eyesight is more
sensitive to luminance component of a color space than to chrominance, i.e. one can recognize even small difference
in brightness of an image, but small color perturbations are oblivious to human’s visual system. This is one among
many properties operating on the surplus bandwidth that are used in such applications as compression, steganography
or watermarking.
Watermarking describes a model of a communication, where a user needs to embed a message into a digital image and
send it to a recipient. Afterwards the image may be manipulated on by an attacker, however a legitimate user who shares
a set of joint strategies of embedding and extracting the message should be able to recover the embedded message from
the (possibly manipulated) image. The goal of the attacker is to modify the image, without significant deterioration, in
order to destroy the embedded message, yet preserving the commercial value of the original data.
During the work on watermarking techniques, we need to handle three following requirements [2]:
1. transparency concerns the quality of the image after the watermark encoding. In general, the original and
watermarked images need to be perceptually similar. All distortions affected by the watermark embedding
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should be invisible for the human eyes, so that the value of the data for the consumers does not deteriorate. In
our work, we utilized peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR), which measures the pixel-wise difference between
two images;
2. robustness describes user’s ability to decode the message from the encoded images after applying some signal
processing operations on it. These operations could be applied intentionally, in order to destroy the watermark,
or be a result of technical requirements or limitations. In this work, we used a terminology attacks referring to
these operations. Examples of attacks include cropping, resizing, Gaussian blur or JPEG compression;
3. capacity was defined in [3] as "the number of bits a watermark encodes within a unit of time or work". In
this paper, we considered local or block bits per pixel capacity. The size of the block could be delimited by
calculating the longest distance on which an information about any pixel is spread over the image using the
encoder architecture based on the sequence of the convolutional layers, e.g. for one convolutional layer with
the kernel size equal to 7, the block size is 3 and for two layers with kernel size equal to 5, it is 4.
In this paper, we introduce a novel technique of embedding a secret message into a digital image and extracting it
using convolutional neural networks. We proposed a method of spatial spreading of the secret message over the image,
which significantly reduces the local (block) bits per pixel capacity and at the same time preserves robustness on spatial
attacks, such as rotating or cropping. Additionally, using the spatial spreading method significantly reduces the time
of the training phase in comparison to previous solutions. The proposed method has been validated against a wide
group of attacks including lossy compression techniques, such as subsampling and JPEG compression, and spatial
attacks, such as rotating and cropping. Despite considering such attacks by the multimedia community throughout the
history of ’classic’ watermarking, some of these attacks were neglected by other authors of recent watermark encoding
solutions using neural networks, even though the attacks are easy to apply, and some of them are common components
of a lossy compression techniques. We also divided the considered attacks into five groups based on the scope they
affect the image. Next, we shown that it is essential to apply the attacks from various groups in order to build a robust
deep learning system for watermarking. Finally, we evaluate the robustness of our method against the attacks in terms
of the quality of the image measured by peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR).
Our contribution is (1) a new architecture of the spatial-spread encoder and decoder as well as (2) the formulation
of a loss function matching the architecture. (3) We improved the robustness against particular attacks in comparison to
the current state-of-the-art methods, especially JPEG lossy compression algorithm, resizing and Gaussian blurring. (4)
We handled new types of attacks, such as subsampling, which is a part of JPEG algorithm. (5) We proposed precise
differentiable approximation for JPEG compression algorithm. (6) The resulting training framework required half the
time in comparison to prior solutions. (7) We prepared the analysis of attacks’ types – we grouped the typical attacks
according to their scope, which is helpful in choosing the appropriate and balanced set of attacks applied to the noiser
layers and deriving dependencies between them.
2 Problem formulation
The main goal of the watermarking methods is to embed an additional information, called a watermark, into a digital
image, called cover image in a way, that allows recovering the watermark by a legitimate user. The watermark needs to
be robust against some signal processing operations, called attacks. Our method is a blind technique, thus the decoder is
not provided with an access to the original image. In this work, we considered the following attacks: cropping, cropout,
dropout, rotation, Gaussian smoothing, subsampling 4:2:0, JPEG compression, resizing. All attacks as well as the
watermark encoding need to ensure the transparency of the image.
We aim to encode a binary message m ∈ {0, 1}L, where L is a positive integer, in the cover image Ic of shape
H ×W × Ch. The result of this operation is the encoded image Ie containing the hidden watermark m. Both images
Ic and Ie need to be perceptually indistinguishable. Next, an attacker modifies Ie by applying selected attacks in order
to indispose to extract m from the encoded image. An output after the modification is a noised image In which has
three channels and unspecified width and height. Finally, we try to extract a hidden message m′ ∈ {0, 1}L from In that
satisfies ‖ m−m′ ‖< δ.
3 Related work
The problem of transparent and robust embedding of an additional information into a digital domain was deeply studied
for many years. Watermark solutions could be divided into two types non-blind and blind. The non-blind solutions
require an original copy of the image for a detection step, whereas blind methods are able to detect a message encoded
into the covertext without any additional data. Due to their easier application in real-life environment, most recent
2
A PREPRINT
Figure 1: The sketch of the pipeline architecture.
works has been focused on the blind approaches. Many solutions use spatial-to-frequency domain transformations, such
as Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) [4], Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) [5, 6, 7, 8, 9], Discrete Cosine Transform
(DCT) [10, 11, 12] and others [13, 14]. Extreme Machine Learning (EML) is another technique used for embedding
watermarks into digital images which is gaining popularity over the last years [15, 6, 16]. Another method used widely
for handling the watermark problem is Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) that was utilized in [8, 17, 18, 9, 19]
among others. Many presented works handled watermarking with combination of two or more techniques (e.g. [8, 6]).
In recent years, we could also observe increased interest in applying deep learning methods into the watermarking
field. Authors of [20] proposed a framework for training encoder and decoder networks in end-to-end manner due to
adding noiser layers between the encoder and the decoder and an advisory network decided whether the images were
encoded or not. A message was spread over all pixels on an image, hence allowing to achieve impressive robustness for
cropping attacks. The paper was followed by [21], where the authors introduced a novel method of training the original
architecture, called adversarial training. They reported a high robustness against the attacks, however it resulted in
relatively low quality of encoded images measured by the PSNR. Another interesting approach for improving the
robustness of a message detection was using an additional attack neural network for generating generic distortions
introduced in [22]. The authors of [23] designed a fully automated deep learning-based system for watermark extraction
from camera-captured images. In [24], the authors used convolutional neural networks for zero-watermarking which
does not modify the image but extracts some characteristics from the image in order to linking it with an owner. The
paper [25] described a deep learning solution robust against JPEG compression and rotating. In RedMark [26], there
was a special transform layer used on an image before feed forwarding the encoding neural network and they worked
out a differentiable approximation of JPEG.
4 Method
4.1 Architecture
The architecture proposed in the paper consists of six main components. Three of them are trainable neural networks
called encoder Eφ, decoder Dγ and adversarial discriminator/critic Cω, where φ, γ, ω are trainable parameters. The
next component is an additional attacker network A used for performing the attacks from the previous section on the
encoded image. We also specified two deterministic algorithms called message propagator P and message translator
T . The overall sketch of the architecture was presented in Figure 1.
We denote the i-th bit of the message m as mi. Moreover, we represent the message using a sequence of tuples
(i,mki,mki+1 . . . ,mki+k−1), where i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Lk − 1} and 1 ≤ k ≤ L. In particular, for k = 1, we are able
to represent the message as a trivial sequence of tuples (i,mi) for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , L − 1}. We also define a function
binn : N→ {0, 1}n which for a given value returns its binary representation of a length equal to n.
The propagator Pnkb : {0, 1}L → {0, 1}Hb ×Wb ×(n+k) is a function which executes following steps:
1. converts the message m into a sequence of tuples (s0, s1, . . . , sL
k−1),
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Figure 2: The visualization of steps of the propagator P extnkb for parameters n = 2, k = 2, b = 2, L = 8, W = 4 and
H = 4. The numbers under the arrows refer to the propagators steps.
2. for every i, converts the first element of the tuple si to the binary representation binn(si0), flattens the tuple si,
and unsqueezes to si ∈ {0, 1}1×1×(n+k),
3. fills a spatially-spread message M ∈ {0, 1}Hb ×Wb ×(n+k) with unsequeezed tuples si for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Lk −1}.
Note that, we allow to produce redundant data in M , i.e. insert more that one tuple si.
We also need to extend M if the message is an input to the encoder, then we go through with one additional step:
4. repeat b times in horizontal and vertical directions every tuple in M (Mij ∈ {0, 1}1×1×(n+k) is converting to
Mij ∈ {0, 1}b×b×(n+k)).
If the additional step needs to be executed, we denote the propagator by P extnkb and achieve M
ext ∈ {0, 1}H×W×(n+k).
The visualization of the propagator is presented in Figure 2.
The output of the propagator P extnkb together with the cover image Ic is used by the encoder Eφ to produce the encoded
image Ie, i.e.:
Ie = Eφ(Ic,M
ext). (1)
We follow by applying the attacks on the image Ie by:
Ia,M = A(Ie, Ic,M
ext). (2)
Note that, some attacks required the cover image Ic, e.g. dropout. For the crop attack, we also cropped the message M
during the training. The decoder tries to predict the message M having an access only to Ia:
M ′ = Dγ(Ia) ∈ {0, 1}Hb ×Wb ×(n+k). (3)
Additionally, we use Cω to rate if Ie is similar to Ic:
Cω(I ∈ {Ie, Ic}) ∈ [0, 1]. (4)
The last element of the architecture is the message translator To. It is a deterministic function which calculates the final
message m′ based on the decoded message M ′. The process of the calculation is similar to the k-Nearest Neighbours
algorithm. For every i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Lk − 1}, we find o tuples from M ′ with first n values (referred to binary index) that
are closest to binn(i), i.e., we choose a tuple with coordinates xy if ||binn(i) −M ′xy[0,...,n−1]||2 is one of o lowest
values. Then, we calculate mean values for every element encoding a bit of the message, i.e. elements from the tuple on
positions (n, . . . , n+ k − 1). Based on this, we are able to predict all bits from the message m′.
The whole architecture allows to encode the message m in the cover image Ic and reduce a number of the local
(block) bits per pixel capacity. The state-of-the-art and recent architectures of encoders [20, 21, 22] are based on the
convolutional layers. It means that the encoder embeds the watermark message locally, without an access to the whole
image. This architecture of the encoder provokes two ways of encoding the message. (1) Encoding only subset of
the whole message depending on the pixels color space, e.g. encode some bits only if a tone of the pixel is close to
blue. This way of encoding is risky and unreliable. (2) Attempting to encode the whole message locally (in the block
of pixels). A results’ analysis of the robustness on attacks, in particular, the high accuracy against cropping attack,
indicated that the second way of the message encoding is more likely. Thus, we proposed the solution for reducing the
local bits per pixel capacity and improved the robustness against attacks, especially smoothing-like attacks.
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The proposed architecture spreads fractions of the message m over the image in the form of tuples
(i,mki,mki+1 . . . ,mki+k−1), where i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Lk − 1} and 1 ≤ k ≤ L. Note that the spread is performed
in a block fashion rather than assigning the whole message m to every single pixel. For example, we could encode the
message of length L = 32 by splitting it into 8 patches of length equal to 4 (k = 4 and n = 3). Thus, we are able to
encode the patch by 7 bits, where we need 3 bits for the index of the patch and 4 bits for the corresponding fraction of
the massage. During our experiments, we achieved the best results for k = 2.
4.2 Loss functions
We formulated a novel loss function for training our models using gradient descent algorithm. Our general objective
contains three separated loss functions LE , LD and LC , for training the encoder Eφ, the decoder Dγ and the critic Cω
respectively. The nosier layers A are inside the training pipeline and do not contain training parameters. Furthermore,
the message propagator Pnkb and translator To are deterministic algorithms outside of the training pipeline.
The aim of the loss function LE is keeping images Ic and Ie similar. It was formulated as follow:
LE(Ic, Ie) = MSE(Ic, Ie) =
1
H ·W · Ch ||Ic − Ie||
2
2, (5)
where MSE is a standard Mean Square Error function. The loss function LD works on the similarity between propagated
messages M and M ′. However, as M contains redundant data, i.e. the same tuples, we do not need to perfectly recover
the message. Our aim was to extract a subset of tuples with "high confidence" of information. Thus, we formulated the
loss function LD as a combination of mean and variance functions:
LmeanD (M,M
′) =
b2
H ·W
Hb∑
h=0
Wb∑
w=0
Mean(|Mhw −M ′hw|) (6)
=
b2
H ·W · (n+ k) ||M −M
′||1 (7)
and
LvarD (M,M
′) =
b2
H ·W
Hb∑
h=0
Wb∑
w=0
V ar(|Mhw −M ′hw|), (8)
where Hb = Hb − 1 and Wb = Wb − 1 and the operator | · | returns the absolute value of every element of the vector.
The final loss function is LD = λmeanD L
mean
D + λ
var
D L
var
D . Such formulation of the loss function promotes learning of
all elements in some tuples over some elements over all tuples.
We also defined the adversarial training for the encoder Eφ and the critic Cω. By this, we were able to achieve better
visual similarity of the images Ic and Ie. For the encoder Eφ, we expected to produce images following the transparency
requirement, thus we defined the loss function LEC = log(1− Cω(Ie)). On the other hand, the rule of the critic Cω was
to distinguish between the "real" images Ic and the modified image Ie, thus in this case we defined the loss function
LCC = log(1− Cω(Ic)) + log(Cω(Ie)).
Finally, we ran the gradient decent algorithm on φ and γ parameters in order to minimize the loss function over the
distribution of images Ic and messages M :
EIc,M [λELE + λmeanD LmeanD + λvarD LvarD + λCLEC ], (9)
where λ-s are weights for particular losses. We simultaneously conducted the training of the critic Cω with parameters
ω by minimize the loss function over the distribution of images Ic: EIc [LCC ].
4.3 The architecture of the networks
The main block applied to the neural networks, i.e. the encoder Eφ, the decoder Dγ and the critic Cω, is a sequential
structure of a convolutional layer with 64 channels, the kernel size equal to 3× 3, stride equal to 1× 1 and padding
equal to 1× 1, then a batch normalization layer and a ReLU activation. All networks operate on images in YCbCr color
space.
The encoder Eφ contains five sequential blocks, where the first block is fed by the concatenated tensor of the image
Ic and the spread message Mext. Next, the tensor [Ic,Mext] is also concatenated with the input before every second
convolutional layer, i.e. 1st, 3rd and 5th layer has an access to the cover image and the spread message. The last encoder
5
A PREPRINT
layer is the convolution with 3 channels and default other parameters. Note, that the number of layers in the encoder
Eφ does not exceed the other state-of-the-art methods, e.g. [20, 21, 22, 26]. It is important in the context of a time
performance as in many practical scenarios (e.g. streaming) the encoder needs to work in real-time.
The decoder Dγ takes the encoded image Ie and puts it through 6 sequential blocks. Then, we apply an adaptive average
pooling layer which produces a tensor with a size equal to Hb × Wb × 64. Next, the tensor is fed to the sequential block
with 64 channels, the kernel size and the padding equal to 1× 1. The last layer is the separated convolution layer with
k + n channels, the kernel size and the padding remain unchanged. Thus, the decoder returns a tensor with the same
size as M . The last two convolutional layers imitate fully connected layers for every spatial element of the output over
channels. Note that during our experiments we did not change the size of the tensor produced by the adaptive pooling,
i.e. the decoder returned the output tensor with the same size also after cropping or resizing attacks. Executing actions
regarding attacks’ types could improve the robustness of the method, but requires a method to recognize the attack’s
type and counters the end-to-end approach, thus we decided to return M ′ with the same size in every case.
The critic Cω consists of three sequential blocks, an adaptive average pooling layer which produces a 64-dimensional
vector, then a fully connected layer. The critic returns the value describing a similarity of the input image to real images.
4.4 Noiser layers and Attacks
We selected some nosier layers which we later applied during the training process. We exposed to the neural networks
various kinds of distortions which they needed to handle in order to increase the performance. By this, we were able to
determine a way of the training of the neural networks. The types of selected distortions included cropping and cropout,
dropout, Gaussian smoothing, rotation, subsampling 4:2:0, approximation of JPEG and resizing.
The crop distortion returns a cropped square of the image Ie of a specified area ratio p = H
newWnew
HW . The cropout
attack works similar to the crop, it crops the square of the image Ie and instead of discarding the rest of the image,
it replaces the extant area by the image Ic. As in [20], we decided to use the image Ic as the background for the
encoded image Ie, because this simulates a binary symmetric channel (BSC), which is a standard model considered in
information theory, where a receiver does not have knowledge if a obtained bit is correct or wrong. Applying monotonic
or random color of pixels of the extant area imitates other simple communication model called a binary erasure channel
(BEC). The cropout attack was parameterized by us with a value p equal to a ratio of the cropped area over the entire
image area. The dropout attacks keeps a percentage p of the pixels of the image Ie and the rest pixels replaces with
corresponding pixels of the image Ic. As in the cropout, this procedure also simulates the BSC model. The Gaussian
smoothing was done with a parameter σ (a kernel width).
Next four attacks are our extension of those presented in [20, 21]. The rotation attack rotates the image by α degrees.
The subsampling 4:2:0 is applied in many digital compression algorithms, such as JPEG or MPEG, and is the most
popular from all its variants (e.g. 4:2:2, 4:1:1). It reduces the image channels Cb and Cr by calculating an average
value of every square of 2× 2. The procedure could be done using a 2D convolutional layer with one channel, kernel
size equal to 2 × 2, stride equal to 2 × 2 and weights set to 0.25. We also used the resize attack with a scale factor
s = H
new
H =
Wnew
W . We handled two types of interpolation – Nearest neighbours and Lanczos.
Approximation of JPEG. Lossy compression algorithms could be considered as most efficient attacks against a wide
range of watermarking protocols. This comes from the fact that algorithms such as JPEG are very efficient in removing
barely visible objects and which are not essential for the viewer. On the other hand, all watermarking techniques aim at
changing the image in a way that is hardly noticeable for the viewer.
Thus, it was necessary to apply them into the training pipeline in order to obtain an appropriate design for the encoder
and the decoder training. The main inconvenience of the JPEG is a rounding operation applied on quantized frequency-
domain elements of the image. The derivative of the round function is indeterminate for points x ∈ Z and equal to 0 in
the rest of the domain. Thus, using the rounding function in the middle of the training pipeline is impossible due to
halting the update of the neural networks weights by the gradient descent algorithm. We proposed an approximation
of JPEG compression which executes the following steps for the image I: (1) converting to YCbCr color space, (2)
subsampling 4:2:0, (3) splitting separately every channel into blocks of 8×8 (4) applying the Discrete Cosine Transform
(DCT), (5) dividing by the quantization table Q and (6) applying the approximation of the rounding. The last two steps,
we formulated as follows:
I ′ij =
{
0, if − 12 ≤ IijQij ≤ 12 ,
Iij
Qij
+ δQij , otherwise,
(10)
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where δ ∼ N(0, σ2), Iij is the frequency-domain element of the image andQij is the related element of the quantization
table. For our experiments, we set σ = 0.01. We used the standard quantization table for the quality parameter q = 50
and we modified the elements of the table Q for different q in accordance with the JPEG standard [27, 28].
To the best of our knowledge it is the most precise differentiable approximation of the classic JPEG applied to the deep
learning training pipeline for the watermarking. For the evaluation procedure, we used the standard JPEG.
4.5 Training details.
The method was trained on the COCO dataset [29]. We used 10000 randomly sampled cover images for the training
subset and 1000 for the validation subset. Both subsets were disjoint. The messages were sampled randomly and
also the spatial spreading was random. The parameters λE , λmeanD , λ
var
D and λC were set to 4.0, 1.0, 1.0 and 0.01,
respectively. We used Adam [30] with learning rate equal to 0.001 and other default parameters for the stochastic
gradient descent optimization. The models were trained with batch size equal to 12. The final training with applied all
nosier layers took 100 epochs.
5 Analysis of the attacks
We observed that most of the attacks considered by us could be distinguished into more general groups based on their
specific characteristics. Thus, we classified attacks regarding the way in which they affect the image. We also assumed
that after any attack a content of the image needs to be visible and its quality has to be acceptable to the customers.
With these assumptions, we consider five types of the attacks:
• Pixel-specific, where we modify only single pixels (without considering any others) by changing color, adding
noise, replacing pixels by other random ones, removing some pixels or changing their position on the image.
In this group we could specify two subgroups: one that applies one modification on all pixels, and the other
that applies one modification on a subset of pixels. A characteristic of this group is that we have an access to a
smaller subset of non-modified pixels after attacks or all pixels were transformed in the same specific way. To
this group, we selected some attacks such as color space conversions, cropping, cropout, dropout and rotation.
• Local, where we modify pixels with regard to their local neighborhoods. In this group, all pixels are modified
during attacks, but only neighbours of the pixels affect on the results (e.g., subsampling, Gaussian blur and
resizing).
• Domain, where modifications are domain-specific and even small changes in limited neighbourhoods could
affect globally on an image represented in a different domain. This group of attacks includes all transforms
methods, e.g. Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT).
• Mixed, where a final modification is a combination of methods from other groups. Here we could distinguish
JPEG which combines color space conversion, subsampling and locally applied DCT.
The analysis of attack types could be important and helpful in the context of designing a training pipeline. Most of the
recent deep learning solutions for watermarking use additional noiser layers in order to improve robustness for particular
attacks (e.g. [20, 21, 26]). It requires to choose a finite set of attacks applied during the training process. Moreover, all
attacks in the training pipeline need to be differentiable as the noiser layers are usually embedded before the neural
network responsible for the message’s detection. As such, it requires deferential approximations of non-differentiable
attacks, e.g. JPEG compression. An appropriate choice of attacks for a training pipeline could cause a high robustness
for other attacks which were not applied to the training pipeline. In [22], where authors proposed a distortion agnostic
method using adversarial neural networks, we could observe that even small perturbations generated by attacks classified
by us into the local group noticeably decrease an accuracy of the message detection. It could mean that the attack neural
network generated the distortions belonging to the pixel-specific or domain groups and ignored attacks similar to these
from the local group. In our work, we focused on selecting a special set of attacks which covers all four groups.
5.0.1 Robustness on exclusionary attacks’ selection.
We conducted an experiment where we trained the pipeline with only a subset of the attacks, from only one of the
mentioned groups, and we observed its impact on the robustness on the attacks from the same group and from the others.
The results was presented in the Table 1. The experiments confirmed that there exist a correlation between the ways of
image modifications by particular attacks and stronger correlations are noticeable between attacks belonging to the
same group. It is trivial to notice, that crop and cropout attacks do not modify a complete (whole) patch of an image, i.e.
the decoder has an access to the non-modified patch. The dropout attack changes random pixels, but still the decoder
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Figure 3: The visualisation of attacks’ applications. The row above refer to the noised image In and the row below refer
to the normalized difference between the noised image In and the encoded image Ie. We used min-max normalization.
The used cover image Ic is presented in Figure 4.
Table 1: The table shows the results of the experiment of applying attacks from the same group during the training
process. The values in the table refers to the bit accuracies. The red color indicates the attacks which were used during
the training and the blue color refers to the best accuracy achieved for the non-applied attacks. Note, that best results
were achieved around the same groups of the attacks.
Attacks Noiser Layers
Identity
Crop(p = [0.3, 0.9])
Dropout(p = [0.3, 0.9])
Gaussian(σ ∈ {3, 5})
Subsampling(4:2:0)
Identity 0.999 0.991 0.985
Crop(p = 0.3) 0.847 0.894 0.833
Cropout(p = 0.3) 0.793 0.875 0.672
Dropout(p = 0.5) 0.530 0.972 0.574
Rotate(a = 5◦) 0.754 0.821 0.780
Gaussian(σ = 5) 0.823 0.564 0.981
Subsampling(4:2:0) 0.524 0.623 0.980
Resize(s = 0.5, m = L) 0.511 0.532 0.735
JPEG(q = 95) 0.502 0.512 0.783
could detect the message based on not-modified pixels. Thus, applying only the subset of the attacks during training we
could achieve more general robustness on a wider collection of attacks from the same group.
6 Watermark robustness
In this section, we presented the evaluation of our method and the comparison with the current state-of-the-art solutions.
The experiments were done for the images of the size 256× 256 and the message of the length L = 32. Our main goal
was reducing the local bits per pixels capacity, thus we set k = 2. By this, the number of bits required for storing the
patch (tuple) was equal to 6 and the number of the patches was equal to 16. The tuple stored two bits of the message
and the related index which took four bits. The block size b was set to 16. In order to spread all patches over the image,
we needed to locate 16 blocks with the size equal to 16 × 16 pixels. It indicated that the smallest size of the image
was equal to 64× 64 pixels. The final method was trained with all types of attacks applied to the noiser layers. We
considered the bit accuracy as a metric for calculating the robustness against attacks. The results of the robustness on
attacks were presented in the Table 2.
6.0.1 Lossy compression versus watermark encoding.
Lossy compression algorithms and watermark encoders work in the same subdomain of the image, i.e. they try to modify
invisible pixels in order to reduce a size of the image or encode additional information in the image, respectively. Thus,
we considered these algorithms as a special and sophisticated group of attacks. Assuming invisibility of the watermark,
the encoder should change these pixels which are removed or modified by the lossy compression algorithms. Therefore,
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Table 2: The results of the bit accuracy for some types of the attacks and the comparison with the state-of-the-art
methods. Note that, the resizing modes were not specified in [22] and [26].
Attacks Methods
Our HiDDeN [20] DADW [22] RedMark [26]
Identity 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Crop(p = 0.3) 0.832 1.0 1.0 -
Cropout(p = 0.3) 0.902 0.94 - 0.925
Dropout(p = 0.5) 0.962 1.0 1.0 ≈0.99
Rotate(α = 5◦) 0.842 - - -
Gaussian(σ = 2) 0.986 0.96 0.6 0.5
Gaussian(σ = 4) 0.982 0.82 0.5 0.5
Subsampling(4:2:0) 0.984 - - -
Resize(s = 0.5, m = N ) 0.849 - 0.671 0.819Resize(s = 0.5, m = L) 0.908 -
JPEG(q = 50) 0.831 0.67 0.817 0.746
Figure 4: The comparison of the encoded image Ie (middle row) and the cover image Ic (above). The row below shown
the min-max normalized difference between the cover image Ic and the encoded image Ie.
in our work we mainly focus on preserving a robustness on lossy compression techniques as contemporary multimedia
applications or services use lossy compression algorithms by default and it is impossible to skip the compression step
due to some technical reasons, such as the limitations of the broadcast bandwidth.
6.0.2 Robustness vs. quality of images.
The method was evaluated for the PSNR equal to 30.19dB, 37.81dB and 37.46dB for the Y, Cb and Cr channels,
respectively. The quality of the encoded image is similar to results achieved in [20]. In [22, 26], authors reported
slightly higher values of the PSNR. All methods achieved the quality of the images similar to the lossy compression
algorithms [31], where the average PSNR for all channels is typically above 30dB. We did not take into consideration
the results of robustness from [21] because their method modifies the image significantly. In order to compare the
distortion level we calculated the PSNR for our validation dataset after applying JPEG compression algorithm with the
quality factor q = 50 and the subsampling 4:2:0. We achieved the PSNR equal to 36.35dB, 36.78dB and 36.92dB for
the Y, Cb and Cr channels, respectively. And without using the subsampling technique, we achieved 37.90dB, 38.17dB
and 38.29dB. The results of the PSNR suggest that the message was encoded on the Y channel chiefly.
9
A PREPRINT
7 Conclusions
In the paper we proposed the watermarking method based on spatial spreading of the message. Our architecture is done
with convolutional neural networks and is scalable for any size of an image. We developed a special architecture for the
encoder network where the cover image and the message are yielded to every second layer. We also formulated a novel
and custom loss function for training the neural networks. In comparison to previous method our watermarking system
provides significantly improvement of robustness against Gaussian smoothing, resizing and JPEG, which are attacks
from the local group. The work was extended by additional attack types, such as subsampling 4:2:0 or rotation. We also
achieved the bit accuracies above 0.83 for all considered attacks. This indicates that the method accomplished high
general robustness exceeding previous solutions. As a way to obtain our results, we additionally provided a precise
differentiable approximation of JPEG compression and grouped the attacks on the watermark based on their scope.
In future work we would like to continue to improve the robustness against the attacks as well as apply and evaluate
multi-attacks scenarios. We would like to increase the message capacity and extend the solution over a video domain
and video-specific compression algorithms. Moreover, some other quality measures like the one presented in [32] may
be considered in order to adjust the transparency.
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